EAC & CYTA contract: smart electricity meters

IOANNIDES DEMETRIOU LLC, acting on behalf of the Electricity Authority of Cyprus, has secured a victory of pivotal significance to our client and the electricity market of Cyprus

Client Alert: IOANNIDES DEMETRIOU LLC, acting on behalf of the Electricity Authority of Cyprus, has secured a victory of pivotal significance to our client and the electricity market of Cyprus in general before the Court of Appeal (Administrative Division).

The judgment in Appeals 13/2024 and 14/2024, handed down on the 18.7.2024, reverses the first instance judgment of the Administrative Court and paves the way for the signature of the contract between the Electricity Authority of Cyprus and the Cyprus Telecommunications Authority (CYTA) for the installation of 400,000 smart electricity meters all over Cyprus.

This project, valued at approximately EURO 50million, is a highly significant project as it represents a major and long awaited first step in the opening of the electricity market as well as the advent of the smart grid in Cyprus. Additionally, the introduction of a first roll out of 400,000 electricity smart meters will allow EAC and consumers to obtain electricity consumption data in real time. This translates to cost savings, improved efficiency, better planning and forecasting in relation to energy consumption and a host of other advantages the Cypriot consumer can benefit from.

The three lawyers involved in the matter from the outset on the part of our firm were our Managing Director, Andrew Demetriou and senior members of our Administrative law team, namely Partner Mrs. Anna Christou and Associate Director Mr. Demetris Kailis.

Pictured above at the signing ceremony of the contract between EAC and CYTA on 24.7.2024, from left to right, is the General Manager of EAC Mr. Adonis Yiasemides, the President of the Board of EAC Mr. George Petrou, the President of the Board of CYTA Mrs. Maria Tsiakka Olympiou, the Minister of Energy of the Republic of Cyprus Mr. George Papanastasiou and the Director General of the Ministry of Energy Mr. Marios Panayides.

The Implementation of Telework Law Framework

The implementation of the remote working law framework. Article by Irene Kattami, Senior Associate at Ioannides Demetriou LLC

The landscape of work has undergone significant transformation in recent years, which was particularly accelerated by the global pandemic. Teleworking has become increasingly common, prompting the need for a clear legislative framework to govern its implementation. This need has been addressed with the House of Representatives’ approval of a comprehensive framework regulating remote working. The Framework for Telework of 2023 Legislation (the “Law”), which came into effect on December 1, 2023, aims to establish guidelines and protections for both employers and employees navigating the remote work environment.

The Law stipulates that teleworking can be implemented under the following circumstances: (i) an optional teleworking scheme may be adopted subject to a written agreement entered into between the employer and the employee, (ii) mandatory teleworking may be imposed under a Decree issued by the Minister of Health due to public health considerations and (iii) mandatory teleworking may be required for an employee whose health is demonstrably at risk, which can be mitigated by refraining from working on the employer’s premises.

Apart from prescribing the conditions under which teleworking can be established, the Law also delineates the responsibilities that the employer bears towards the employee. Firstly, among these obligations is the coverage of expenses incurred by the employee related to teleworking. These expenses include various aspects, such as equipment costs (unless agreed to utilize the employer’s equipment), telecommunications, usage of the home workspace, and the maintenance and repair of equipment. Moreover, the employer bears the responsibility of ensuring that the employee receives the essential technical support required for their work. To further regulate the financial aspects, the Minister of Labour and Social Insurance is expected to issue a Decree specifying the minimum teleworking cost payable to the employee. Importantly, the Law stipulates that any expenses covered by employers will not be considered as part of the employee’s remuneration, but they are deemed as deductible expenses, exempted from both social insurance and taxation.

In maintaining consistency with the aforementioned responsibilities, the employer is obliged, among other things and in addition to those outlined in the Occupational Safety and Health Law 1996 to (i) have at their disposal a suitable and sufficient written risk assessment of the existing teleworking risks, (ii) determine the preventive and protective measures to be taken based on the written risk assessment, (iii) provide such information, instructions, and training to ensure the safety and health of their employees. Employers have the same health and safety responsibilities for employees, whether they work from home or in a workplace.

Furthermore, the Law requires that employers should provide certain information to employees regarding teleworking, within eight (8) days from the date of commencement of such arrangement. This information includes:
a) The employee’s right to disconnect;
b) An analysis of the extend of teleworking costs incurred by the employer;
c) The equipment necessary for the provision of services remotely and the procedures in place for the technical support, maintenance and repair of the equipment;
d) Any restrictions on the use of the equipment and any penalties in case of violation of the restrictions;
e) The agreement regarding remote readiness, it’s time limits and the response deadlines of the teleworking employee;
f) An evaluation of the risks associated with remote work and measures taken by the employer for their prevention based on the risk assessment;
g) The responsibility to protect and secure the professional and personal data of the teleworking employee and the relevant procedure to comply with such obligation;
h) The supervisor from whom the teleworker will receive instructions.

Any information which does not have to be personalised and addressed to teleworking employees, can be communicated to appropriate personnel through the employer’s internal policies.

Employees engaged in teleworking have the equivalent rights and obligations as their counterparts working on-site at the employer’s premises, including rights or obligations concerning their workload, assessment criteria and procedures, compensation, access to employer-related information, training, professional development, and where applicable trade union activity including their unhindered and confidential communication with trade union representatives.

A key protection established by the Law is the employees’ right to disconnect in order for the provisions of the Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions Law to be implemented. Employers and employees’ representatives are required to agree on the technical and organizational methods to ensure that remote employees can disconnect from electronic communication without any adverse consequences. If no such agreement is reached, employers must still notify employees of this right.
Moreover, the Law also sets out the duties and powers of Inspectors, who are officials of the Ministry and/or other public servants appointed by the Minister of Labour and Social Insurance. Their primary responsibility is to ensure the thorough and effective enforcement of the provisions of the Law. Failure to comply with the provisions of the Law could render employers liable, with potential fines upon conviction not exceeding €10.000.

In conclusion, the Framework for Telework of 2023 represents a significant step towards formalizing and protecting the evolving landscape of remote work. This legislation not only establishes clear guidelines and responsibilities for both employers and employees but also ensures a fair and supportive environment for teleworking. By addressing key aspects such as expense coverage, health and safety requirements, and the right to disconnect, the Law aims to create a balanced framework that promotes productivity while safeguarding employee well-being. As teleworking becomes an integral part of the modern work environment, the effective implementation and adherence to this framework will be crucial in fostering a sustainable and equitable remote working culture.

Corporate tax policy and the European Union institutions

Newsletter: Corporate tax policy and the European Union institutions by C. HJI Panayi, June 2024

On the 9th of June 2024, Cyprus and other Member States elected their representatives to the European Parliament. This is the only institution of the European Union whose members are directly elected from the people. Nevertheless, this is also one of the institutions with limited powers in many areas. As far as taxation is concerned, the European Parliament has no role whatsoever in the legislative process. This is rather ironic, given the general political slogan of ‘no taxation without representation’.

But which institution makes tax policy in the European Union? The answer is not very straightforward and requires a basic understanding of institutional dynamics in the European Union and competences.

The most important institutions in the European Union are the European Commission, the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament, the European Council and the Court of Justice of the European Union. The legal system of the European Union, as underpinned by the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, empowers these institutions to participate in the law-making process but only when such power has been so conferred under EU law. In other words, different institutions have different law-making powers, and can only act within the scope of these powers (i.e. competences).

The European Commission is the quasi-executive body of the European Union which proposes laws and manages and implements EU policies. In the field of competition law, it also has some judicial functions. There are 27 Commissioners – one from each Member State. The Commissioners are not directly elected but they are appointed by the government of each Member State. However, once appointed, they are not supposed to represent their Member State. Rather, they take on a portfolio of a policy area and assisted by the relevant directorates-general, they exercise leadership in that area. As far as taxation is concerned, the relevant portfolio is that of ‘economy’ and it is assisted by the DG-TAXUD.  

The Council of the European Union is the institution which represents Member State governments in different configurations. The configuration relevant for taxation is the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) configuration, which is made up of the economic and finance ministers from all Member States. It is in the ECOFIN meetings that the Commission tax proposals are considered and voted upon. The Presidency of the Council rotates among Member States every six months.

The European Council is the EU institution that defines the general political direction and priorities of the European Union. The members of the European Council are the heads of state or government of the 27 EU member states, the European Council President and the President of the European Commission. It has bi-annual meetings, usually at the end of each Council presidency.

The European Parliament comprises of the Members of the European Parliament, which are directly elected by voters in each Member State. Although usually parliaments are legislative bodies, the European Parliament’s powers are rather limited and circumscribed. In the adoption of legislative acts, a distinction is made between the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision), whereby the European Parliament is on an equal footing with the Council, and the special legislative procedures, which applies only in specific cases where Parliament has a consultative role only. In certain areas such as taxation the European Parliament can only ever give an advisory opinion.

The Court of Justice of the European Union is the judiciary of the European Union and is considered to be the guardian of the Treaties. The judges of the Court of Justice are appointed by Member States though again, not to represent the Member States, but to apply and interpret EU law in the spirit of the acquis communaitaire.

As mentioned above, each institution can only exercise law-making powers only to the extent that it has competence to do so – this is EU competence. Broadly, EU competence can be exclusive or shared. Where the EU does not have any competence, then this area has remained within the exclusive powers of Member States.

Trade policy and trade law is an exclusive competence of the European Union. This means that only the European Union (through the relevant institution(s)) can legislate on trade matters and conclude trade agreements with third countries. A Member State cannot enter into its own trade agreements with other countries, nor deviate from the EU’s trade rules. This was one of the thorny issues under the Brexit negotiations: the UK was not able to negotiate trade agreements with third countries until it left the EU. That is why there was a brief transition period following the UK’s departure from the EU during which period it still benefitted from the EU’s trade agreements with third countries.  

There can also be shared competence, where both the EU and Member States can legislate. Examples of shared competence are the internal market, environment and consumer protection.  

As far as corporate taxation is concerned, the EU has no competence whatsoever. This remains within the powers of Member States. Nevertheless, even in areas where the EU has no competence, sometimes, the EU legislates by using what I call ‘proxy’ legal bases under the Treaty. More characteristically, in the area of taxation, general (i.e. non-tax specific) Treaty provisions have been used to propose tax legislation, such as Art 115 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Pursuant to this Article, the Commission can propose directives in any area it does not have competence (e.g. taxation) on the basis that this is necessary for the establishment or functioning of the internal market. This Treaty provision stipulates that for these proposals to become law, they must be approved by all Member States in Council. This unanimity requirement often makes it very difficult for any tax proposal to go through, as even one Member State can veto the proposal.

A distinction should be made between direct taxation (which includes corporate taxation and the taxation of individuals) and indirect taxation (which includes VAT, customs & excise taxes, etc). The latter area is largely harmonized. It should be pointed out that the Treaty provision which enables the harmonization of indirect taxes (Art 113 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) also requires unanimity in Council. However, from the early stages of the European Union, there has always been more willingness by Member States to harmonise these taxes compared to direct taxes, which are thought of as more closely aligned with sovereignty.

In any case, due to the lack of competences and the use of general Treaty proxy bases, the Commission and the Council are effectively the only EU institutions that have a meaningful role in the development of direct tax policy. This can be problematic if it is a controversial proposal, which does not enjoy the support of all Member States. It can take years for such proposal to go through, if at all. Even if it does go through, the amendments made to appease some Member States may significantly water down the approved legislation or render it incoherent.

Let us take as an example the proposal for a Financial Transaction Tax. This was first proposed in 2011 but has never been approved. There was an attempt to bypass the unanimity requirement by proposing to introduce a Directive through enhanced cooperation (i.e. only to bind the Member States agreeing to it) but again, this has not been successful. Up until recently, a draft Directive on a Financial Transaction Tax featured in the agenda of ECOFIN meetings but it seems to have faded away.

A more recent example of a proposal which faced opposition in Council but this time eventually got through is the Directive on Minimum Effective Tax Rate. This was originally proposed in December 2021, with the expectation that it would be transposed into the domestic law of Member States by 1 January 2023. However, from the beginning Member States voiced concerns and asked for the delayed implementation of it (mostly, Estonia, Hungary and Poland). Two subsequent revised compromise texts were rejected at ECOFIN meetings in March and April 2022. Whilst many had written off this draft Directive, rather surprisingly, unanimity was achieved in Council (at an ECOFIN meeting) in December 2022 and the Directive was eventually approved.

One could argue that the power of the fiscal veto protects some of the smaller Member States from being forced into unwanted tax harmonization. However, experience from recent years suggests that apart from some Member States in the eastern bloc, smaller Member States such as Cyprus, Malta, Ireland, Luxembourg are unlikely to veto tax proposals. The fiscal veto is more effectively used by the larger Member States to block a proposal. For example, the UK’s objections to the proposed Financial Transaction Tax were one of the reasons that the proposal never went very far. It was feared that with the UK’s departure from the European Union there would be a power vacuum and all tax proposals would be pushed through in Council but some Member States have very effectively filled this gap.  

This brief overview explains how the institutional dynamics, combined with the very restrictive legal bases (Treaty bases) for harmonization, have led to limited and often uncoordinated legislation produced in the area of corporate taxation. There have been calls to remove the unanimity requirement and allow other Treaty bases to be used which only require qualified majority voting. So far, these calls have been resisted by most Member States. Nevertheless, this seems to be a pyrrhic victory as experience so far shows that many of the smaller Member States are rather muted when it comes to negotiations in Council. But the threat of vetoing Commission tax proposals, especially if raised by more than one Member States, is a powerful deterrent for the Commission to make amendments. Therefore, alliances amongst Member States are crucial in influencing tax policy in the EU.  

What this brief note shows is that in principle, Member State governments have the final say in the development of corporate tax policy, through their voting in Council. However, whether they choose (or are able to) exercise their power of veto is often a political question. Rather counterintuitively, due to the limitations of the legislative process, taxpayers often have a greater role in the development of tax law in the EU, but in a reactive manner. Taxpayers can challenge domestic tax laws on the basis that they breach the EU’s fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights. They can also make complaints to the Commission and urge it to start an infringement proceeding against a Member State on the basis of Art 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Many important developments in the area of corporate tax policy in the European Union were in fact a result of taxpayers’ action, with the help of a good legal team.

For more information on any of the issues raised in this newsletter, please get in touch with us.

Another win for SAPA

Client Alert: IOANNIDES DEMETRIOU LLC has achieved a significant win for its client, the Paphos Sewerage Board (SAPA) in the arbitration relating to the claim raised by the Saur-Iacovou JV consortium on 12/03/22 based on article 19.1 of the contract for the Operation and Maintenance of the Paphos Sewerage Board Biological Unit. located in Achelia, which involved an additional payment of €2,400,000 until the end of the 8- year contract. A final decision has been issued by the arbitrator Mr. Costas Clerides (former Attorney General of the Republic of Cyprus) which rejected the said claim in its entirety and awarded the legal costs of the Paphos Sewerage Board as the successful party to the proceedings.

View Paphos mayor Mr. Phedon Phedonos’ release here.

The case was handled by our Director, Demetris Kronides.

Η αλήθεια για την Διαιτησία στην Κύπρο

Οι νέοι Κανονισμοί Πολιτικής Δικονομίας έχουν ήδη προκαλέσει αισθητή μείωση στην καταχώριση νέων αγωγών στα Δικαστήρια. Αυτό επειδή με τους νέους Κανονισμούς η προεργασία που απαιτείται να γίνει από τον διάδικο και τον δικηγόρο του, είτε για να εγερθεί μια αγωγή είτε για να καταχωριστεί μια υπεράσπιση, είναι περισσότερη από ότι ήταν με τους παλαιούς θεσμούς. Γενικότερα, με τους νέους Κανονισμούς, όλες οι δικονομικές διαδικασίες που συνθέτουν μια δικαστική διαδικασία απαιτούν περισσότερες ανθρωποώρες για να εκτελεστούν αλλά και πρέπει να γίνουν σε πολύ στενότερα χρονικά περιθώρια. Εκτιμώ ότι σύντομα θα δούμε αύξηση του κόστους παροχής δικηγορικών υπηρεσιών που αφορούν εκπροσώπηση στο Δικαστήριο αλλά αυτό είναι ένα άλλο, συνδεδεμένο μεν, ζήτημα. 

Ένεκα των πιο πάνω ριζικών αλλαγών, τα Δικαστήρια και η πολιτεία αναμένουν και προσδοκούν ότι οι Νέοι Κανονισμοί Πολιτικής Δικονομίας θα προκαλέσουν αύξηση στην εξωδικαστηριακή επίλυση διαφορών και εννοείται ότι η κύρια μέθοδος εξωδικαστηριακής επίλυσης διαφορών στην Κύπρο είναι η Διαιτησία.

Συνεπώς αποφάσισα να γράψω αυτό το άρθρο για να θέσω ορισμένα πράγματα στην ορθή τους βάση και διάσταση, ενόψει αυτής της αύξησης που αναμένεται στις Διαιτησίες στην Κύπρο, έτσι ώστε ο αναγνώστης να μπορεί να αποφασίσει εάν επιθυμεί να χρησιμοποιήσει τα Δικαστήρια ή την Διαιτησία για να επιλύσει την διαφορά του.

Εάν ο αναγνώστης έχει ήδη υπογράψει σύμβαση που περιέχει ρήτρα διαιτησίας, πάλι θα μπορεί να ενημερωθεί ως προς το πως να διαχειριστεί την διαιτησία έτσι ώστε να αυξήσει τις πιθανότητες η όλη διαδικασία να στεφθεί με επιτυχία.

Αρχίζω με το να πω ότι υπάρχουν αρκετές παρανοήσεις σε σχέση με την Διαιτησία και αυτό παρασύρει διαδίκους σε λανθασμένες αποφάσεις. Οι λανθασμένες αυτές αποφάσεις στο τέλος καταλήγουν να προκαλούν αυξημένο κόστος, σπατάλη χρόνου, ταλαιπωρία και εκνευρισμό στους διαδίκους.

Συγκριτικό Κόστος Διαιτησίας vs Δικαστηρίου

Η πρώτη παρανόηση είναι ότι η Διαιτησία είναι πιο οικονομική από πλευράς εξόδων από το Δικαστήριο. Αυτό ουσιαστικά δεν αληθεύει. Η Διαιτησία δεν είναι πιο οικονομική από το Δικαστήριο και εξηγώ. Είτε στο Δικαστήριο είτε στην Διαιτησία ο διάδικος θα εκπροσωπηθεί από Δικηγόρο, άρα αυτό το κόστος είναι σταθερό και στις δύο περιπτώσεις. Επίσης στην Διαιτησία όπως και στο Δικαστήριο η μαρτυρία είναι της ίδιας έκτασης, άλλα και οι ανθρωποώρες που θα δαπανήσει ο διάδικος για να προετοιμαστεί για να μαρτυρήσει πάλι είναι οι ίδιες.

Όμως στην Διαιτησία, οι διάδικοι θα πρέπει να πληρώσουν τον Διαιτητή ή τους Διαιτητές τους και σε ορισμένες περιπτώσεις θα πρέπει να πληρώσουν και ορισμένα άλλα κόστη όπως τους χώρους συνεδριάσεων και κόστη της Διαιτησίας. Στο Δικαστήριο πληρώνεται ένα αρχικό ποσό με την καταχώριση της αγωγής και μετέπειτα τα κόστη υπό μορφή χαρτοσήμων είναι πολύ χαμηλά. Ούτε και πληρώνεις τον Δικαστή με την ώρα και ούτε και πληρώνεις τον Δικαστή παραπάνω αναλόγως των επίδικων θεμάτων ή την έκταση των δικασίμων ή το χρόνο που θα του πάρει να συντάξει την οποιαδήποτε απόφαση. Στην Διαιτησία όμως αυτά τα επιπλέον κόστη υπάρχουν και αναλόγως της περίπτωσης μπορεί να αυξηθούν δραματικά. Επίσης, στην περίπτωση Δικαστηρίου η αίθουσα διεξαγωγής της δίκης είναι δωρεάν ενώ στην Διαιτησία υπάρχουν (κάποτε) το κόστος του χώρου της Διαιτησίας όπως και το κόστος της στενογράφου κτλ. που πληρώνονται από τους διάδικους αναλόγως της μεταξύ τους συμφωνίας και/ή του αποτελέσματος της Διαιτησίας.

Χρόνος Αποπεράτωσης

Δεύτερη άποψη που επικρατεί, και η οποία ελλοχεύει κινδύνους, είναι ότι η Διαιτησία είναι πιο γρήγορη από το Δικαστήριο. Για να κρίνουμε το εάν η Διαιτησία είναι πιο γρήγορη από το Δικαστήριο πρέπει να γνωρίζουμε από που προέκυψε η άποψη αυτή. Η άποψη αυτή προέκυψε από το ότι οι αγωγές ήταν τόσες πολλές που προηγουμένως χρειαζόταν 5 – 6 χρόνια μέχρι να έρθει η σειρά της αγωγής για ακρόαση και σύνολο 6 – 8 χρόνια μέχρι να εκδοθεί απόφαση. Ειδικότερα, αγωγές του Επαρχιακού Δικαστηρίου Λευκωσίας που ήταν και το πιο βαρυφορτωμένο όντως έπαιρναν τόσο καιρό και πολλές φορές ακόμη περισσότερο. Σε άλλα Επαρχιακά Δικαστήρια, όπως αυτό της Πάφου ή της Αμμοχώστου, η περίοδος κυμαίνετο στα τουλάχιστο 4 – 5 έτη. Δηλαδή ήταν ο όγκος των αγωγών που κατέστησε την Διαιτησία πιο γρήγορη στα μάτια των διαδίκων.

Αυτό όμως με τον χρόνο, δηλαδή σε βάθος 4 – 6 ετών, ευελπιστούμε ότι θα αλλάξει επειδή οι αγωγές, ένεκα των Νέων Κανονισμών Πολιτικής Δικονομίας (τουλάχιστο αυτό ήταν το όλο σκεπτικό πίσω από την μεταρρύθμιση), θα μειωθούν και άρα θα δίδεται ημερομηνία ακρόασης πολύ πιο γρήγορα. Υπάρχουν ορισμένες πολύ αισιόδοξες θα έλεγα προβλέψεις για εκκίνηση της ακρόασης εντός 2 ετών. Δεν νομίζω να κινηθεί τόσο γοργά η διαδικασία αλλά θεωρώ ότι ένας χρόνος εκδίκασης εντός 2.5 – 3.5 ετών από την καταχώριση θα είναι εφικτός στα επόμενα 4 – 6 χρόνια. Αυτός είναι πάλι αρκετός καιρός αλλά είναι πολύ πιο λίγος χρόνος από ότι χρειαζόταν προηγουμένως.  

Υπάρχει αλήθεια στην άποψη ότι η Διαιτησία είναι πιο γρήγορη από το Δικαστήριο αλλά  αυτό ισχύει μόνο εάν η Διαιτησία όντως κινείται με την δέουσα σπουδή. Μια Διαιτησία όπου ο Διαιτητής δεν «κουμαντάρει» επαρκώς την διαδικασία ή τους διαδίκους ή όπου Διαιτητής, δικηγόροι και διάδικοι δεν έχουν την δυνατότητα να δικάσουν συνεχόμενα (ή δεν επιθυμούν για τον ένα ή τον άλλο λόγο να την προχωρήσουν γρήγορα) μπορεί να πάρει αρκετά πιο πολλά έτη παρά ότι χρειάζεται και δεν είναι καθόλου δύσκολο να φθάσει τα 3 – 4 έτη.

Επίσης, το εάν μια Διαιτησία θα ολοκληρωθεί σε ένα, δύο, τρία ή τέσσερα και βάλε έτη είναι κάτι που εξαρτάτε όχι από τον θεσμό της Διαιτησίας αλλά κυρίως από τον Διαιτητή, τους δικηγόρους που την χειρίζονται αλλά και πιο σημαντικά, από τους ίδιους του διαδίκους. Η οποιαδήποτε καθυστέρηση, αναλόγως της περίπτωσης, είναι από τους προαναφερόμενους τρεις συμμετέχοντες που θα προκληθεί.

Εννοείται ότι σε ορισμένες περιπτώσεις υπάρχουν πολύπλοκες διαιτησίες με δικόγραφα που απαριθμούν εκατοντάδες σελίδες και εκατοντάδες τεκμήρια. Αυτές όντως είναι δικαιολογημένο να διαρκέσουν 2 – 4 έτη. Το πρόβλημα είναι όταν διαιτησίες οι οποίες δεν είναι ιδιαίτερα πολύπλοκες καταλήγουν να διαρκούν το ίδιο με τις πολύπλοκες.

Τελεσιδικία της Διαδικασίας

Τρίτη παρανόηση είναι ότι η απόφαση της Διαιτησίας είναι δεσμευτική για τα μέρη. Νομικά η απόφαση της Διαιτησίας είναι όντως δεσμευτική για τα μέρη αλλά αυτό δεν σημαίνει ότι ο διάδικος που έχασε στην Διαιτησία δεν έχει δικαίωμα να ενστεί στην εγγραφή της.

Η έκδοση διαιτητικής απόφασης δεν αποτελεί τελεσίδικο μέτρο. Σε αντίθεση με απόφαση δικαστηρίου ή τελεσιδικία στην περίπτωση Διαιτητικής απόφασης επέρχετε με την αναγνώριση και εγγραφή της σε αρμόδιο Δικαστήριο. Συνεπώς ένας επιτυχών διάδικος σε Διαιτησία, εάν ο αποτυχών διάδικος δεν σεβαστεί την απόφαση του Διαιτητή, θα αναγκαστεί να αιτηθεί στο Δικαστήριο για να την εγγράψει για μπορέσει να την εκτελέσει. Επίσης, ο αποτυχών διάδικος στην Διαιτησία θα έχει αναφαίρετο δικαίωμα να καταχωρίσει ένσταση στην αίτηση για εγγραφή και να αιτηθεί την ακύρωση της απόφασης του Διαιτητή για διάφορους νομικούς και πραγματικούς λόγους που επιτρέπει η νομολογία.

Συνεπώς θα έλεγα ότι η ορθή διάσταση του όλου πράγματος είναι ότι ναι μεν η απόφαση του Διαιτητή είναι δεσμευτική για τα μέρη στο ότι δεν μπορούν να την εφεσιβάλουν στον ίδιο ή σε άλλο Διαιτητή αλλά δεν είναι άμεσα εκτελέσιμη όπως είναι η απόφαση του Δικαστηρίου. Δεν είναι λίγες οι περιπτώσεις όπου το Δικαστήριο έχει ακυρώσει αποφάσεις Διαιτητών με αποτέλεσμα η νίκη στην Διαιτησία να ήταν άνευ σημασίας. Άρα μέσω του Δικαστηρίου απευθείας, αποφεύγεται αυτός ο κίνδυνος της μη εγγραφής της απόφασης του Διαιτητή. Αυτό το αναφέρω επειδή πολλή διάδικοι θεωρούν ότι ήρθαν στο τέλος του δρόμου με την έκδοση της απόφασης του Διαιτητή υπέρ τους και μετά αντιλαμβάνονται ότι κέρδισαν την πιο κύρια μάχη αλλά υπάρχουν και άλλες μάχες (και άλλα έξοδα) μέχρι να τελειώσει ο «πόλεμος».

Πρόσθετες Οικονομικές Πτυχές

Τέταρτο ζήτημα που οπωσδήποτε χρίζει αναφοράς και επισήμανσης είναι το γεγονός ότι η Διαιτησία εμπεριέχει ένα κίνδυνο που αφορά την πληρωμή του Διαιτητή. Ο διάδικος ο οποίος επιθυμεί να προκαλέσει καθυστερήσει ή να αποφύγει την πληρωμή ή που ουσιαστικά δεν θέλει να λυθεί η διαφορά επειδή θεωρεί ότι τον συμφέρει να παραμείνουν τα πράγματα όπως έχουν έχει την ευχέρεια να λειτουργήσει ανέντιμα και να μην πληρώνει το δικό του μερίδιο των εξόδων του Διαιτητή καθυστερώντας έτσι την διαδικασία.

Δεν είναι λίγες φορές που ο Διαιτητής ετοιμάζει την απόφαση του και ζητά από τους διαδίκους να πληρώσουν το τιμολόγιο του για τους την αποστείλει και ο διάδικος ο οποίος θεωρεί ότι θα χάσει ή ο οποίος δεν του συμφέρει η έκδοση της απόφασης αρνείται να καταβάλει το δικό του μισό των εξόδων. Το αποτέλεσμα είναι ότι πληρώνει όλο το κόστος του Διαιτητή ο διάδικος που επιθυμεί να εκδοθεί η απόφαση και μετά τρέχει για να εγγράψει την απόφαση του Διαιτητή στο Δικαστήριο έτσι ώστε εισπράξει αυτό το κόστος μαζί με το ποσό που επιδίκασε υπέρ του ο Διαιτητής. Και στο Δικαστήριο μπορεί να δημιουργήσει κανείς καθυστέρηση αλλά τουλάχιστο δεν επιβαρύνεται ή άλλη πλευρά με το κόστος έκδοσης της απόφασης.

Υπάρχουν και ορισμένες περιπτώσεις όπου διάδικος πλήρωσε όλο το κόστος του Διαιτητή και μετά απέτυχε στην εγγραφή της απόφασης (για τον ένα ή τον άλλο λόγο) και άρα στην ουσία πλήρωσε για μια απόφαση παντελώς άχρηστη.

Ο Διαιτητής οφείλει να μειώσει αυτό το κίνδυνο στο ελάχιστο με το να εκδίδει συχνά ενδιάμεσα τιμολόγια έτσι ώστε το τελευταίο τιμολόγιο, αυτό της έκδοσης της απόφασης, να μην είναι φορτωμένο με προηγούμενη ατιμολόγητη εργασία. Αυτό όμως δεν το έχουν πάντα κατά νου όλοι.  

Η σημασία των ορθών επιλογών και αποφάσεων

Τα προαναφερόμενα σκοπό έχουν την παράθεση της ορθής διάστασης και δεν διαφοροποιούν και δεν αλλοιώνουν το ότι η Διαιτησία ήταν, και παραμένει, εξαιρετική μέθοδος εξωδικαστηριακής επίλυσης διαφορών, για τις κατάλληλες όμως περιπτώσεις και νοουμένου ότι παρθεί μια σειρά ορθών και σοφών αποφάσεων, οι οποίες θα θέσουν τα θεμέλια για μια γρήγορη διαδικασία διαιτησίας η οποία με την σειρά της θα καταλήξει στην έκδοση μιας εγγράψιμης απόφασης.

Η πρώτη απόφαση που πρέπει να παρθεί, και ίσως η πιο σημαντική, είναι ως προς το πρόσωπο του Διαιτητή.

Ο Διαιτητής πρωτίστως οφείλει να έχει χρόνο να φέρει την Διαιτησία εις πέρας γρήγορα. Ένας Διαιτητής μπορεί να έχει χρόνο σε μια περίοδο και σε άλλη να μην έχει επειδή ανάλαβε και άλλες εργασίες ή επειδή είναι επαγγελματίας (δικηγόρος, αρχιτέκτονας, πολιτικός μηχανικός, επιμετρητής ποσοτήτων κλπ.) και έχει και άλλες επαγγελματικές υποχρεώσεις. Άρα οι διάδικοι θα πρέπει εξ αρχής, πριν την επιλογή του Διαιτητή, να κάνουν μια συζήτηση μαζί του για να διαπιστώσουν ότι την συγκεκριμένη περίοδο έχει τον χρόνο να προωθήσει την διαδικασία με την δέουσα σπουδή.

Η δεύτερη απόφαση που πρέπει να παρθεί και η οποία πάλι αφορά το πρόσωπο του Διαιτητή είναι το κατά πόσο ο συγκεκριμένος Διαιτητής είναι ο πιο κατάλληλος για να επιλύσει την συγκεκριμένη διαφορά και να καταλήξει σε μια εγγράψιμη απόφαση.

Παραδείγματος χάριν, μπορεί η διαφορά να αφορά ένα οικοδομικό συμβόλαιο και τα μέρη να συγκλίνουν στην επιλογή ενός Διαιτητή ο οποίος είναι επαγγελματίας στον κατασκευαστικό τομέα. Όμως εάν πέραν των τεχνικών ζητημάτων η διαφορά εμπεριέχει και διαφωνία ως προς σωρεία νομικών ζητημάτων τότε μπορεί ο εν λόγω επαγγελματίας του κατασκευαστικού τομέα να μην είναι ο πιο κατάλληλος για να την επιλύσει. Ένας αρχιτέκτονας σίγουρα μπορεί να κρίνει καλύτερα από ένα δικηγόρο εάν κάτι συνιστά κακοτεχνία με βάση τα σχέδια ή εάν η επιλογή ενός υλικού ήταν ή δεν ήταν η κατάλληλη αλλά σίγουρα θα δυσκολευτεί να αποφασίσει νομικά ζητήματα όπως εάν το τάδε τεκμήριο αποτελεί αποδεκτή μαρτυρία ή την νομική ερμηνεία ενός συγκεκριμένου όρου ή τις νομικές προεκτάσεις μιας σειράς γεγονότων. Πάλι αυτός ο επαγγελματίας θα αποφασίσει τα νομικά αυτά ζητήματα αλλά θα του πάρει πολύ περισσότερο χρόνο (τον οποίο βεβαίως θα χρεώσει) από αυτό που θα έπαιρνε σε ένα δικηγόρο και επιπλέον είναι αυξημένες οι πιθανότητες να προβεί σε κάποιο νομικό σφάλμα το οποίο να επηρεάσει το κύρος της τελικής απόφασης.

Το ίδιο όμως μπορεί να λεχθεί και για ένα δικηγόρο ο οποίος αναλαμβάνει μια διαιτησία η οποία ναι μεν περιέχει διαφωνία σε μερικά νομικά ζητήματα αλλά η μεγάλη διαφωνία έγκειται ως προς τα τεχνικά ζητήματα. Βεβαίως και ο δικηγόρος μπορεί να αποφασίσει το και τεχνικό κομμάτι αφού ακούσει την μαρτυρία των διαδίκων και των εμπειρογνωμόνων τους αλλά ενδεχομένως να ήταν καλύτερα οι διάδικοι να είχαν αποταθεί σε επαγγελματία του τομέα της διαφοράς αφού η διαφορά τους ήταν παραπάνω επί τεχνικών σημείων παρά επί νομικών.

Για να διασφαλίσουν μια γρήγορη διαδικασία καθώς και την έκδοση μιας εγγράψιμης απόφασης οι διάδικοι οφείλουν να αναλογιστούν την ίδια την φύση της διαφοράς τους. Με το να αποταθούν σε δικηγόρο μεγιστοποιούνται οι πιθανότητες η απόφαση να είναι εν τέλη εγγράψιμη και να μην ακυρωθεί ένεκα κάποιου νομικού παραστρατήματος. Συνεπώς οι διάδικοι θα πρέπει να αποφασίσουν εάν θα αρκεστούν στο να πείσουν τον Διαιτητή που είναι νομικός επί τεχνικών ζητημάτων μέσω της παράθεσης της μαρτυρίας τους μόνο ή εάν θα ορίσουν και ένα τεχνικό τον οποίο ο Διαιτητής θα μπορεί να συμβουλεύεται για να τον βοηθήσει να αποφασίσει περίπλοκα τεχνικά ζητήματα, μαζί με τα νομικά.

Το αντίστροφο μπορεί και να γίνει σε περίπτωση που οι διάδικοι κρίνουν ότι τα τεχνικά ζητήματα είναι πιο καίρια ή πιο πολλά από τα νομικά. Μπορούν είτε να αναλάβουν το ρίσκο ο καθένας να πείσει τον Διαιτητή ο οποίος είναι τεχνικός (και όχι νομικός) επί των νομικών ζητημάτων ή μπορούν να ελαχιστοποιήσουν το ρίσκο μιας λανθασμένης από νομικής άποψης απόφασης με να συμφωνήσουν να ορίσουν ένα δικηγόρο τον οποίο ο Διαιτητής θα συμβουλεύεται για να τον βοηθήσει να αποφασίσει περίπλοκα νομικά ζητήματα.

Αυτά τα ρίσκα μειώνονται σε μεγάλο βαθμό όπου το επίδικο ποσό είναι αρκετά μεγάλο και άρα δικαιολογεί την παραπομπή της διαφοράς σε τρείς διαιτητές, δηλαδή και τεχνικούς και νομικούς μαζί (εάν είναι τέτοια η φύση της διαφοράς).

Δεν πρέπει να ξεχνούμε ότι η επιλογή του ποιος ή ποιοι θα αποφασίσουν την διαφορά είναι ένα από τα κύρια προτερήματα της Διαιτησίας καθότι στο Δικαστήριο δεν μπορείς να διαλέξεις δικαστή. Η ουσία το όλου πράγματος όμως έγκειται στο ότι οι διάδικοι οφείλουν να αναγνωρίσουν την φύση της διαφοράς τους και να λάβουν τα κατάλληλα μέτρα και/ή να πάρουν ορθές και λογικές αποφάσεις έτσι ώστε να μεγιστοποιήσουν τις πιθανότητες η διαδικασία  να αρχίσει και να ολοκληρωθεί με την δέουσα σπουδή και να οδηγήσει στην έκδοση μιας ορθής, δίκαιης και πάνω από όλα εγγράψιμης διαιτητικής απόφασης.

Μετέπειτα, η επόμενη σημαντική απόφαση που πρέπει να λάβουν οι διάδικοι είναι ποιος δικηγόρος θα τους εκπροσωπήσει στην Διαιτησία. Αυτό έχει να κάνει τόσο με τις γνώσεις του δικηγόρου σε σχέση με την Διαιτησία και την εγγραφή και ακύρωση διαιτητικών αποφάσεων αλλά και με τον χρόνο που έχει να διαθέσει ο εν λόγω δικηγόρος για να δικάσει την Διαιτησία. 

Η Διαιτησία επιτρέπει κάτι το οποίο δεν επιτρέπει το βαρυφορτωμένο πρόγραμμα των Δικαστηρίων, το οποίο δεν είναι άλλο από την συνεχιζόμενη εκδίκαση. Αυτός είναι και ένας από τους λόγους που μπορεί να είναι πολύ πιο γρήγορη από το Δικαστήριο. Συνεπώς εάν τα μέρη επέλεξαν ένα Διαιτητή ο οποίος έχει τον απαιτούμενο χρόνο και μετά επέλεξαν και δικηγόρους οι οποίοι μπορούν να δικάσουν συνεχόμενα, παραδείγματος χάριν από Δευτέρα μέχρι Παρασκευή ή για δύο οι τρείς συνεχόμενες εβδομάδες (εάν η διαφορά το απαιτεί) τότε η Διαιτησία θα κινηθεί πολύ γρήγορα και θα λήξει αισίως.

Άρα είναι εμφανές ότι οι διάδικοι έχουν πολλά να σκεφτούν και πολλά να αποφασίσουν, τα οποία θα παίξουν σημαντικό ρόλο και θα κρίνουν το κατά πόσο η διαδικασία διαιτησίας θα επιτελέσει τον σκοπό της.

Θεωρώ δόκιμο να δώσω ένα παράδειγμα μιας επιτυχούς διαδικασίας διαιτησίας. Πρόσφατα εκπροσωπήσαμε σε διαδικασία διαιτησίας ένα ημικρατικό οργανισμό. Αντίδικος ήταν μια μεγάλη εταιρεία η οποία ήταν στρατηγικός συνεργάτης του ημικρατικού αυτού οργανισμού.

Προέκυψε διαφορά στην μεταξύ τους σύμβαση και ακριβώς επειδή και οι δύο διάδικοι ήταν σοβαροί και ήθελαν να επιλύσουν την διαφορά τους για να μπορεί να συνεχίσει η επαγγελματική τους σχέση, επέλεξαν από μόνοι τους να χρησιμοποιήσουν τον θεσμό της Διαιτησίας. Η διαφορά ήταν ουσιαστικά νομική αλλά ο Διαιτητής θα έπρεπε να ακούσει και μαρτυρία από εμπειρογνώμονες.

Για Διαιτητή τους επέλεξαν ένα έγκριτο νομικό. Φυσικά, δεν τον επέλεξαν απλά και μόνο επειδή ήταν έγκριτος νομικός. Τον επέλεξαν και για τις νομικές του γνώσεις φυσικά, και για το έντιμο του χαρακτήρα του αλλά και ένεκα του ότι είχε το χρόνο να φέρει την διαιτησία εις πέρας με την δέουσα σπουδή. Το ύψος της διαφοράς ήταν τέτοιο που επέτρεπε την δαπάνη των μερικών εκατοντάδων ευρώ ανά ώρα για ένα Διαιτητή ο οποίος είχε το κύρος, τις γνώσεις, την ικανότητα αλλά και τον χρόνο να φέρει εις πέρας την διαδικασία Διαιτησίας.

Επιπλέον, η νομική κατάρτιση του Διαιτητή ήταν τέτοια που ελαχιστοποιούσε την πιθανότητα να πετύχει η οποιαδήποτε ένσταση στην μετέπειτα αίτηση για εγγραφή της απόφασης του. Για τους πιο πάνω λόγους οι διάδικοι αποτάθηκαν από κοινού στον συγκεκριμένο Διαιτητή. Δηλαδή οι διάδικοι ήδη από την αρχή, συνεργάστηκαν για την επιλογή του Διαιτητή τους χωρίς παρατράγουδα και αχρείαστη καθυστέρηση.

Επίσης, οι διάδικοι επέλεξαν να τους εκπροσωπήσουν δικηγόροι που ήταν στο ίδιο μήκος κύματος με τις επιθυμίες και με το συμφέρον των πελατών τους, με την κύρια επιθυμία να είναι να λυθεί η διαφορά δίκαια αλλά και γρήγορα έτσι ώστε να προχωρήσουν οι διάδικοι παρακάτω.

Οι διάδικοι, ακριβώς επειδή ήταν σοβαροί οργανισμοί, αναγνώριζαν ότι είναι πολύ καλύτερα για τους ίδιους να συνεργάζονται παρά να αντιδικούν. Ήθελαν συνεπώς η διαφορά τους να επιλυθεί το συντομότερο δυνατό. Για αυτό τον λόγο οι ακροάσεις της Διαιτησίας ήταν σχεδόν συνεχιζόμενες. Δηλαδή και ο Διαιτητής και οι δικηγόροι και οι μάρτυρες διέθεσαν συνεχόμενες ημερομηνίες από το πρόγραμμα τους για να δικαστεί η Διαιτησία γρήγορα (όπως προανέφερα, αυτή η δυνατότητα δεν υπάρχει στο Δικαστήριο το οποίο πολύ δύσκολα θα βρει τον χρόνο να δικάζει μόνο μια αγωγή για μια η δύο εβδομάδες συνεχόμενα).

Οι συνεχιζόμενες ακροάσεις έχουν και το επιπρόσθετο πλεονέκτημα του ότι ο μάρτυρας ετοιμάζεται μια φορά, μαρτυρεί και τελειώνει. Δεν χρειάζεται να προετοιμαστεί μια φορά για κυρίως εξέταση και μια ή δύο φορές για αντεξέταση σε κατοπινό διάστημα που στο Δικαστήριο μπορεί να είναι και μήνες μακριά. Αυτό εξοικονομεί του εκάστοτε διαδίκου και χρόνο και χρήμα αφού δεν χρειάζεται να προετοιμάσει τους μάρτυρες τους πάνω από μια φορά. Εάν οι ακροάσεις είναι η μια μακριά από την άλλη τότε θα πρέπει να ξαναγίνει η προεργασία προετοιμασίας του μάρτυρα επειδή δεν είναι εύκολο να θυμάται κανείς τι λέχθηκε πριν ένα ή δύο μήνες, ειδικά σε περίπλοκες υποθέσεις. Άρα με τις συνεχιζόμενες ακροάσεις οι διάδικοι γλυτώνουν ανθρωποώρες που στο τέλος της ημέρας αποτιμούνται σε χρόνο και χρήμα.

Επανερχόμενος στην εν λόγω Διαιτησία, η όλη διαδικασία διήρκησε λίγο περισσότερο από ένα χρόνο από την καταχώρηση των δικογράφων μέχρι και την έκδοση της απόφασης. Έδωσαν μαρτυρία διάφοροι μάρτυρες συμπεριλαμβανομένων και εμπειρογνωμόνων. Ο Διαιτητής εν τέλει δικαίωσε τον ημικρατικό οργανισμό. Ουσιαστικά οι εκεί διάδικοι έλυσαν την διαφορά τους σε λίγο πάνω από ένα έτος ενώ εάν καταχωρούσαν αγωγή στο Επαρχιακό Δικαστήριο Λευκωσίας η πιο γρήγορη ημερομηνία ακρόασης θα ήταν κάπου στο 2027 με 2028.

Οι πιο πάνω διάδικοι, ακριβώς επειδή αναγνώριζαν ότι μέσω της Διαιτησίας θα είχαν απόφαση πολύ πιο γρήγορα από ότι εάν έλυναν την διαφορά τους στο Δικαστήριο, και επειδή προβήκαν σε μια ορθή επιλογή διαιτητή έθεσαν τις βάσεις επιτυχίας της διαδικασίας μέσω των αρχικών τους επιλογών και αποφάσεων.

Άρα η θετική κατάληξη της διαδικασίας (δηλαδή χωρίς καθυστερήσεις, χωρίς αχρείαστη ταλαιπωρία και χωρίς σπατάλη χρόνου και χρήματος) δεν ήρθε κατά τύχη αλλά ως αποτέλεσμα μιας σειράς ορθών και ενημερωμένων αποφάσεων που έθεσαν τα ορθά θεμέλια για την όλη διαδικασία.

Ευελπιστώ ότι διαβάζοντας το άρθρο αυτό, το οποίο έχει ως σκοπό να θέσει ορισμένα πράγματα που αφορούν τον θεσμό της Διαιτησία στην ορθή τους βάση και διάσταση,  ο αναγνώστης στο τέλος της ανάγνωσης, να είναι σε καλύτερη θέση από ότι ήταν προηγουμένως για να λάβει πιο ενημερωμένες, και άρα πιο ορθές αποφάσεις, για το πως να επιλύσει καλύτερα την διαφορά του, είτε αποφασίσει να την επιλύσει μέσω του θεσμού της Διαιτησίας είτε μέσω των Δικαστηρίων. .

Για περισσότερες πληροφορίες ή εάν έχετε ερωτήσεις που άπτονται του περιεχόμενου αυτού του άρθρου παρακαλώ επικοινωνήστε με τον κ. Θεόδουλο Δημητρίου.

Για να λαμβάνεται άμεση ενημέρωση για τα άρθρα των δικηγόρων του Ιωαννίδης Δημητρίου Δ.Ε.Π.Ε μπορείτε να ακολουθήσετε το Ιωαννίδης Δημητρίου Δ.Ε.Π.Ε στο LinkedIn.

Navigating Trust Litigation Safely: Understanding Beddoe Orders

Trustees play a crucial role in managing trusts, ensuring the best interests of beneficiaries are upheld while navigating legal complexities. However, when trustees face litigation, the potential for personal liability can be a daunting prospect.

Indemnity out of the trust fund or personal liability?

Although the general rule of trust law is that a trustee is entitled to be indemnified out of the trust fund for any expenses or liabilities properly incurred on behalf of the trust, this general principle is only applicable when the trustee is acting properly and reasonably. Therefore, trustees may lose their right to protection from liability if it is found that they have brought, defended or continued proceedings unreasonably. As the trust lacks distinct legal identity, the proceedings typically involve actions either initiated by or directed against the trustee in their capacity as such and therefore trustees often litigate at their own risk as to costs.

Enter the Beddoe Order, a legal mechanism designed to protect trustees from such risks while safeguarding trust assets.

What is a Beddoe Order?

Named after the landmark case Re Beddoe (1893) 1 Ch 547, a Beddoe Order allows trustees to engage in legal proceedings in their capacity as trustees, ensuring that they will be reimbursed from the trust fund for any expenses incurred in the litigation. This order effectively shields trustees from personal liability and covers both the trustees’ own costs and the costs trustees are ordered to pay to third parties.

The primary reason for trustees to seek a Beddoe Order is to mitigate the personal financial risks associated with trust-related litigation. Without such protection, trustees could find themselves personally liable for legal costs if the court later deems their actions unjustified or not in the best interests of the trust.

Procedure for a Beddoe application

A Beddoe application should be brought by the trustee, before the latter embarks on any litigation. The application would normally be brought in separate proceedings by the alternative procedure provided by Part 8 of the New Civil Procedure Rules and pursuant to the provisions of the Cyprus International Trusts Law no. 69(I)/1992 as amended, which enables a trustee to seek the Court’s directions as to how they will act in relation to a particular matter.

The Court assesses the arguments presented by the trustee and any other parties to the Beddoe application, e.g. the beneficiaries, to determine whether initiating, defending, or continuing the underlying proceedings serves the overall interests of the beneficiaries. This decision involves discretionary judgment, with the Court having the freedom to consider any relevant factors. Specifically, the Court considers aspects such as the anticipated outcome and costs of the underlying proceedings, as well as the proceedings’ value to the trust.

Appropriateness of a Beddoe Order

However, a Beddoe application is not appropriate in all types of trust disputes. As per the distinction deriving from Alsop Wilkinson v. Neary [1996] 1 WLR 1220, there are three types of trust litigation:

(a) A third party dispute between trustees and third parties, for example for breach of contract between the trustee, in their capacity as trustee, and a third party.

A Beddoe application is more standardly used in third party disputes where in the normal course of events, a trustee acting reasonably would not bear the costs of the litigation personally.

(b) A trust dispute, namely a dispute concerning the trust and the trust assets. A trust dispute can be either ‘‘friendly’’ or ‘‘hostile’’.

Friendly claims are those who are deemed to be brought for the benefit of the trust fund as a whole and usually involve questions as to the proper construction of the trust instrument and questions arising in the course of the administration of the trust. Beddoe applications are considered appropriate in cases of friendly trust disputes.

On the other hand, hostile claims are usually third party claims alleging for example that trust assets should never have formed part of the trust fund or challenging the validity of the trust. A Beddoe application is rarely appropriate in the case of hostile trust disputes because the Court would first need to resolve the underlying dispute before deciding whether it is appropriate to determine the costs in advance.

(c) A beneficiaries dispute, i.e. a dispute between the trustee and one or more beneficiaries stemming from the trustee’s actions in administering the trust, for example, a beneficiary’s claim for breach of trust or for failure of the trustee to exercise their discretion or their duties.

As in the case of hostile trust disputes, by applying for a Beddoe Order in a beneficiaries dispute, the trustee is considered to be asking the Court to pre-empt the resolution of the underlying dispute and therefore, the appropriate course in such cases is to resolve the underlying dispute before determining the costs.

Can a trustee obtain Beddoe relief retrospectively?

Nevertheless, as it was decided in Blades v. Isaac [2016] EWHC 601 (Ch), the trustee’s failure to seek a Beddoe Order before embarking in litigation, does not prevent them from requesting a Beddoe Order and being indemnified from the assets of the trust at the end of the proceedings, once the issues at stake have been clarified.

As trust law evolves, the role of Beddoe orders continues to adapt to new challenges and legal interpretations. Recent developments in the UK and other common law jurisdictions indicate that courts are willing to grant Beddoe relief to trustees, provided that trustees act in the best interests of the trust overall when navigating legal proceedings and suggest an increased emphasis on transparency and accountability in trust administration.

Conclusion

Although in all common law jurisdictions, seeking for Beddoe relief is common practice, Cypriot courts have not yet thoroughly addressed the issue, possibly because of specific indemnity clauses in trust deeds. However, trustees should consider prudent to forego a Beddoe application only in circumstances where they already possess a distinct indemnity, specifically granted vis-a-vis the litigation in question. In the complex landscape of trust administration, Beddoe Orders serve as a crucial tool for trustees to navigate litigation safely while protecting trust assets and beneficiaries’ interests. By understanding the significance of Beddoe Orders and seeking them when necessary, trustees can fulfill their duties with confidence, without risking personal liability.

Ioannides Demetriou LLC: Top Tier Firm in the Legal500 EMEA 2024 rankings

March 2024: IOANNIDES DEMETRIOU LLC has achieved top honours in The Legal 500 EMEA 2024 Rankings.

With top rankings in Banking and Finance, Commercial, Corporate and M&A, Dispute Resolution, Real Estate and Construction, and EU and Competition, our people also received notable recognitions for which we are proud.

The law firm of Ioannides Demetriou LLC has exceptional associates and partners. The associates of Ioannides Demetriou have extensive legal knowledge, are always eager to assist, prompt in their turnaround and a team with qualities that anyone is glad to work with.”

Chairman Pambos Ioannides is in the Hall of Fame for Corporate and M&A, a Leading Individual for Dispute Resolution, and Recommended for Banking & Finance, EU & Competition, and Real Estate and Construction.
Managing Director Andrew Demetriou is in the Hall of Fame for Real Estate & Construction, Dispute Resolution, and Recommended for Corporate and M&A, EU & Competition.
Partner Christina Ioannidou, is a Leading Individual for Banking & Finance, and Recommended for Corporate and M&A, Dispute Resolution, and EU & Competition.

Next Generation Partners: Katerina Hadjichristofi, Zoe Christou, Anna C. Christou, Savvas Yiordamlis, Theo Demetriou

Recommended Lawyers: Christos Frakalas, Demetris Kronides, Anna Christou, Nicolas Panayiotou, Elias Demetriou

Rising Star: Evie Constantinou

Note from the Editor at The Legal 500 Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA), Ella Marshall: “The EMEA guide provides researched coverage of over 80 countries and over 2,700 ranked law firms. Law firms pay nothing to participate and so we are free to make ranking decisions on merit alone.

Our research is conducted annually, providing a detailed qualitative assessment of various factors including work conducted by law firms over the past 12 months and historically; experience and depth of teams; specialisms and ancillary services; and, importantly, opinions of law firms’ clients – each year, The Legal 500 series contacts over 300,000 clients globally to obtain feedback on which law firms meet the criteria required by today’s in-house counsel and business leaders, wherever in the world their work takes them. All of this is used to benchmark each law firm versus competitors in the practice area in question.”

For more information contact us here.

The abolition of the UK’s non-dom regime – Should UK non-doms consider relocation to Cyprus?

The abolition of the UK non-domiciled (or non-dom) status in the last UK budget marks the end of an era for the UK’s tax system. It might also be a game-changer in global mobility as many UK resident non-domiciled individuals might seek to relocate to other jurisdictions in order to shield their overseas earnings from taxation. One such jurisdiction could be Cyprus.

What are the UK’s non-dom rules?

Broadly, non-doms are individuals who are resident in the UK, but who claim that their domicile, being the centre of their personal and financial interests, is outside of the UK. Crucially, hitherto, a non-domiciled individual who was UK tax resident was broadly taxed on income and gains on a remittance basis only by contrast to a UK tax resident and domiciled individual who was taxed on income and gains on a worldwide basis, irrespective of remittance. The UK rules changed a few years ago whereby the non-dom status became time limited and, in fact, after a number of years, a hefty remittance basis charge was levied in order to benefit from the exemption. Nevertheless, it still remained an attractive (optional) regime for high net worth individuals with foreign earnings.

Following last week’s UK budget, the non-dom regime will be abolished from 6 April 2025. In its place, the UK government has introduced a new residence-based regime taking effect from April 2025. What is crucial to note is that the new foreign income and gains regime will be relevant only as far as new tax residents are concerned. This is because under the new regime, individuals who have been non-UK tax resident for at least 10 consecutive years will, regardless of domicile status, be eligible to use the new regime for four years.

Very importantly, under the new regime, non-UK income and gains will not be taxable in the UK and can be brought (i.e. remitted) to the UK without UK taxation during an individual’s four-year eligibility period. From the fifth year of UK tax residence onwards, an individual will be chargeable to UK income tax and capital gains tax on worldwide basis.

It would appear that the new regime will apply to all individuals becoming tax resident in the UK after not being tax resident for 10 consecutive years, irrespective of whether they are UK domiciled. As such, this new regime is likely to be very attractive to (UK) expats who decide to return to the UK.

Although Cyprus has many UK expats, as explained in this newsletter, Cyprus also has a very attractive non-dom regime. Therefore, it is unlikely that UK expats living in Cyprus would relocate to the UK just to benefit from the new regime, as many of the benefits of this regime are essentially replicated in Cyprus’ non-dom regime and for 17 years as opposed to the four years provided for by the UK non-dom regime.

What is likely to happen now is a competition between countries with preferential regimes for high net worth individuals to attract UK non-doms who will no longer benefit from the UK tax regime.

Cyprus is such a jurisdiction with an attractive system overall, combined with special privileges to non-domiciled tax residents.

The concept of domicile in Cyprus law originates from the Wills and Succession Law (Cap 195), which is based on English law. This law provides that every person has a domicile of origin or a domicile of choice. An individual’s domicile of origin is that of his/her father’s domicile (at birth). A person acquires a domicile of choice by establishing his home at any place with the intention of permanent or indefinite residence therein. The domicile of origin prevails and is retained until a domicile of choice is in fact acquired. Under the Special Contribution for Defence Law, a non-domiciled individual may be deemed as domiciled in Cyprus if he/she has been a Cypriot tax resident for at least 17 out of the last 20 years prior to the relevant tax year. This means that Cyprus’ non-dom privileges are available for 17 years.

But what are these non-dom privileges?

The combined application of Cyprus’ tax laws (i.e the Income Tax Law and the Special Contribution for Defence Law) allows Cyprus tax resident individuals who are not domiciled in Cyprus to be exempt on their worldwide dividends and interest, whether remitted to Cyprus or not. It is noteworthy that the exemption applies even if the dividends and interest have a domestic source (i.e. they are derived from Cyprus). There is also an exemption from the special defense contribution tax for rental income (but income tax is payable).

In addition to these privileges, the Cyprus tax system has other advantageous features for tax residents in general, whether domiciled or not.

For example, under Cyprus’ Capital Gains Tax Law, capital gains tax is only imposed on the sale of immovable property situated in Cyprus, and for the sale of shares in companies in which the underlying asset is immovable property situated in Cyprus. There is no capital gains tax in Cyprus for any other disposals. This means that the disposal of any other securities (shares, bonds, tradable contracts etc.) are not subject to tax in Cyprus.

Τhere is also a special tax regime for foreign pension income, which is exempt from tax up to €3,420 per year and taxed at only 5% above that threshold.

Furthermore, Cyprus does not have any inheritance tax or gift tax. Again, these rules are applicable to all Cyprus tax residents – whether domiciled or not.

It should be pointed out that dividends and interest received and pensions are subject to 2.65% General Healthcare System Contributions (GESY). However, this is capped so that for every natural person, the total maximum annual amount on which contributions will be paid is €180,000. This means that the maximum annual amount of GESY contribution levied is €4,770.

Another important tax exemption available to all Cyprus tax residents (whether domiciled or not) is the exemption on income from services rendered outside of Cyprus for more than 90 days in a tax year. The services must be rendered to a non-Cypriot tax resident employer. This, combined with the 50% exemption rule for individuals taking up employment in Cyprus (subject to some other conditions) makes relocation to Cyprus a very attractive option for UK non-doms who wish to explore other jurisdictions.

Of course, in order to access these benefits, as a non-dom or not, it is a prerequisite to become tax resident in Cyprus. For an individual to become tax resident in Cyprus, he/she must be resident in Cyprus for 183 days in the relevant tax year and must not reside more than 183 days per year in another jurisdiction. There is also a quicker route to becoming tax resident in Cyprus under the 60-day rule. Under this rule, an individual must spend at least 60 days in Cyprus in the relevant tax year and must not spend more than 183 days in another jurisdiction. The individual must also maintain a permanent home in Cyprus (owned or rented) and must carry on a business in Cyprus or be employed in Cyprus or hold an office with a tax resident of Cyprus during the relevant tax year.

On the basis of the 60-day rule, it is relatively easy to establish tax residence in Cyprus and obtain the non-dom status, if the aim is to access the specific privileges attached to this status.

Whether or not the abolition of the UK’s non-dom regime will lead to an exodus of high net worth individuals from the UK remains to be seen.

It is worth pointing out however that even before the changes to the UK non-dom regime were abolished Cyprus has for a long time now offered an advantageous tax regime for individuals wishing to take the relatively simple steps required to relocate their residence/domicile to Cyprus.

For information on any of the issues raised in this newsletter, please get in touch with us and note that working closely with our associated corporate services provider Nobel Trust we are able provide the full range of advice and services for anybody wishing to be advised as to the benefits of considering Cyprus as a replacement for UK non-dom status.

The regulation of the content of B2C contracts under Cypriot contract law

Effective consumer protection is an area still in the earliest stages of its development in the Cypriot legal system. Prior to the adoption of Directive 93/13 which provided a substantive test of unfairness and which regulated the content of business contracts through ensuring that unfair terms not be considered binding to consumers, the Cypriot legal system did not provide for a level of consumer protection through statutory or case law. In essence, no measures existed aimed at protecting consumers against contract terms that had not been individually negotiated by consumers in advance and which in turn could grant a considerable advantage to businesses.


Such terms often come in the form of exclusion clauses which can exclude or restrict liability, make the liability or its enforcement subject to restrictive conditions, or exclude or restrict a person from pursuing a right or remedy. As the characteristic of an unfair term is one which increases the number or the difficulty of a party’s obligations, even a force majeure clause may come to be considered unfair if intentionally worded vaguely. If a seller can unilaterally determine a force majeure clause for example, then what is to prevent them from defining a reasonably foreseeable phenomenon as grounds for the removal of liability? Where standard form contracts were established to facilitate commercial transactions and better define the rights and obligations of the two parties, a unilateral approach to the definition of these terms by sellers would necessarily come at the cost of the consumer, who was faced with either accepting these terms or be deprived of the sought goods or services.


Prior to Directive 93/13, Cypriot consumers only had recourse to general principles of contract law and primarily procedural safeguards provided by the Contract Law, Cap. 149 i.e. the key law governing contracts in Cyprus. However and while generally sufficient, Cap. 149 was inadequate in providing the necessary tools in dealing with unfair contract terms, making the implementation of Directive 93/13 necessary for enhanced consumer protection.

Procedural Safeguards of Cap. 149


It could be argued that, in relation to regulating the use of unfair terms, the common law of contract is less concerned with the substance of the contract and more so with the procedure leading to its conclusion. If no illegality is found in what preceded the conclusion of the contract, which could in any way impact the will of the parties to be bound in contract, common law courts would hesitate in intervening since the determination of the substance of the contract remains, based on the principle of privity of contract, within the exclusive competence and autonomy of the parties.


As such, section 13 of Cap. 149, with its emphasis on the concurrence of wills, established that consent is considered a central concept of contract conclusion. If consent is considered to be given “freely”, then the contract is to be respected. With the intention to ensure this, section 14 of Cap. 149 codified a number of principles in order to safeguard that the parties’ consent is “free”, which include provisions on coercion, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation and mistake.


Yet, beyond the rules established in section 14 emphasizing procedural fairness, Cap. 149 did not provide the necessary tools for examining the substantive unfairness of contract terms. Contrarily, while the Indian Contract Act introduced similar procedural rules, Indian courts also made use of the public policy exception under their section 23 (identical to section 23 of Cap. 149) to strike down contracts whose terms were labelled as contrary to public policy, thereby invoking the illegality of the contract’s object or consideration.


In conclusion, Cypriot law follows the general position of English contract law, where the latter has long taken the view that acceptance of the principles of freedom of contract, the binding force of contracts and the lack of a general principle of good faith and fair dealing precludes the review of the fairness of either the contract as whole or of its particular terms. This can most notably be seen in the instance of contract formation. While a promise could not be considered valid without the corresponding consideration, the acknowledgment of an inadequate or nominal consideration signifies that a substantive inequality of bargaining power is not seen as a ground for a vitiation of a contract.


As regards the fairness of particular contract terms, the common law approach can be illustrated most explicitly in its acceptance of the validity of exemption clauses. That is, when once agreed between the parties, knowingly or otherwise, these clauses can effectively exclude liability both in contract and in tort, severely impacting the balance of rights and obligations between the parties. However, beyond a favorable interpretation of the contract in favor of the weaker party in instances of inequality of bargaining power but also through the use of the contra preferentem principle in instances of ambiguity in interpretation of an exclusion clause, and save in instances of a fundamental breach of contract, the Cypriot contract law tools seemed inadequate in properly regulating the use of unfair terms.


Prior to the transposition of Directive 93/13, Cypriot courts had lacked the legal tools to confront the challenges that came with standard form contracts and in particular seemed unwilling to examine the parties’ initial allocation of risk, even if it was done unilaterally and in a standardized manner by one of the contracting parties. Instead of focusing on the pursuit of mutual assent, the courts were content with the finding of the external communication of intention by the parties through their signatures to the contract. Since both parties seemingly gave their consent to be bound by the contract, Cypriot courts appeared hesitant in interfering with its individual terms, beyond through the use of the above mentioned procedural safeguards in instances where the parties consent to be bound could be impacted. These legal circumstances are what justified the need for the implementation of Directive 93/13. It provided courts the ability to control unfair terms in consumer contracts, though the granting of discretionary power as to the interpretation of the substantive unfairness of contract terms through the control of their content. However, while there is still very limited Cypriot case law applying the Directive’s robust two-tiered unfairness test, it remains to be seen if future applications of this test by the Cypriot courts can promote effective consumer protection or if additional national legislation is required to this end.

–> Contact us here for any information on how we can assist you with the application of Directive 93/13 to your consumer contracts

Cyprus’ Path in the European Green Deal: Integrating the Just Transition Mechanism

the European Green Deal #EUGreenDeal

As the European Union (EU) embarks on a transformative journey towards a greener and more sustainable future through the European Green Deal (EGD), the question of ensuring that no one is left behind takes a central stage. This article aims to analyse the measures that the government of Cyprus is undertaking to achieve its 2030 and 2050 climate targets and to assess how the concept of social inclusion is endorsed along the way.

National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP)

Cyprus, like other EU nations, has embraced the ambitions of the EGD, aiming to tackle climate change and move towards sustainability. [1]  The NECP is a vital part of this, mandated by EU regulations from 2021 to 2030. Its main objective is to devise cost-effective policies to meet energy and climate goals, driving economic growth and addressing environmental challenges. [2] Approved by Cyprus’ Council of Ministers in January 2020, it outlines the energy sector’s current status, past policies, and future trajectory to achieve national goals by 2030. Its three key pillars focus on emission reductions, energy efficiency, and increasing renewable energy sources.

For emissions, Cyprus targets a 21% reduction in non-ETS sector emissions compared to 2005 levels. Strategies include promoting natural gas, boosting renewable energy, improving carbon sinks, enhancing energy efficiency across sectors, and reducing emissions in transport, agriculture, and waste. [3]

Regarding energy efficiency, Cyprus aims for a final energy consumption of 2.0 megatonne of oil equivalent (Mtoe) and a primary energy consumption of 2.4 Mtoe by 2030. The plan includes energy efficiency obligations for distributors, low-interest loans for efficiency projects, support programs for households and businesses, voluntary agreements with businesses, and various initiatives for efficient lighting, water, and transportation.

Lastly, Cyprus aims to increase the share of renewable energy sources (RES) in its energy consumption. Targets include RES constituting 23% of gross final energy consumption, 26% of gross final electricity consumption, 39% in heating and cooling, and 14% in transportation.

To achieve these targets, Cyprus has adopted a wide-ranging approach, including various support schemes for RES, incentives for electric vehicles, and integrating RES and energy efficiency into public buildings. Efforts also focus on enhancing RES utilisation in the transportation sector.

Solar water heater adoption rates are impressive, with over 90% of households and 50% of hotels utilising these systems. However, effective energy storage solutions are crucial to fully harness solar potential. [4] Initiatives like the experimental energy storage system in Nicosia and EU projects aim to develop policies for integrating energy storage effectively, boosting photovoltaic self-consumption in the Mediterranean.[5]

To address energy security, Cyprus is implementing Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) imports through the “CyprusGas2EU” project, diversifying energy sources and reinforcing security. Support for projects like the “EuroAsia Interconnector” and “EastMed Pipeline” will further eliminate energy isolation. The EuroAsia Interconnector, connecting Cyprus’ electricity network to the EU continental network, will facilitate RES development, reduce CO2 emissions, and enhance Cyprus’ position in the regional energy sector. [6] This project will also pave the way for widespread adoption of solar energy and sustainable practices, promoting both environmental and economic sustainability. [7]

Future trajectory

Importantly, Cyprus has submitted an updated draft of its NECP to the European Commission for review and approval. This revision is prompted by institutional obligations, failure to meet existing targets, and changes in European energy and climate goals. The revised draft includes, inter alia, commitments to reduce GHG emissions by 32% by 2030 compared to 2005 levels, increase carbon dioxide removals from land use, achieve a 42.5% penetration of RES in gross final consumption by 2030, and contribute to the EU’s mandatory energy efficiency improvement target. [8]

Additionally, Cyprus aims to design policies to support low-emission growth, laying the groundwork for achieving zero emissions by 2050. The Long-Term Low GHG Development Strategy for 2050 aligns Cyprus with the European objective of transitioning to a climate-neutral economy by 2050, emphasising a commitment to a greener future.[9] This strategy complements the NECP and envisions a shift towards clean technologies, promoting innovation and new business models, mitigating climate change impacts, enhancing economic competitiveness, and addressing environmental challenges.

Nevertheless, transitioning to carbon neutrality and renewable energy adoption presents a series of social challenges that require proactive solutions. Therefore, as Cyprus embarks on its journey towards a greener future, the integration of the Just Transition Mechanism (JTM) takes a central role in ensuring that this transition is not only environmentally sound but also socially equitable.

Just Transition Mechanism

The JTM is a critical component of the EGD, acknowledging the socio-economic realities of member states.[10] It provides a framework for financial and policy support to facilitate the transition to cleaner and more sustainable economies while safeguarding livelihoods and communities.[11]Each member state’s unique circumstances further underscore the necessity of adaptable strategies to harmonise environmental and economic aspirations.[12]

In terms of Cyprus, it has recently received the approval for its Partnership Agreement and Just Transition Plan from the EU, entailing over €1 billion in funding from 2021 to 2027. This funding will support various initiatives aimed at promoting economic, social, and territorial cohesion, facilitating the green and digital transition, and fostering competitive, inclusive, and sustainable growth. [13]

One of the most important aspects of the Agreement is the ‘Thalia 2021-27’ Cohesion Policy operational program.[14] A multi-annual, multi-fund development initiative, the Thalia program outlines Cyprus’ strategic plan for utilising resources allocated through the Cohesion Policy Funds.[15]

Central to this initiative is the Just Transition Fund (JTF), which will support an array of vital interventions. The strategic goal is to reduce GHG emissions at the power station in Dekelia and of energy-intensive businesses in general.[16] Recognising the need for social inclusion, Cyprus plans to allocate a portion of the JTF budget to modernise labour market services and support vulnerable populations, women, and youth. Additionally, initiatives to address the shortage of qualified human resources through green education initiatives are emphasised. The program prioritises equal opportunities, non-exclusion, and non-discrimination, ensuring gender equality and compliance with fundamental rights.

In conclusion, Cyprus’ proactive approach aligns with the EGD, addressing climate change, promoting economic growth, and ensuring social inclusion. However, and despite the series of green measures and initiatives that are underway, the nation faces a substantial gap between its commitments and actual outcomes.[17] To improve results and make progress toward the 2030 and 2050 targets, the government of Cyprus must enhance its efficiency in the public sector and collaborate closely with the private sector to streamline not only the processes but also the procedures for implementing all its ambitious projects.

References and URLs:


[1] General Secretariat of European Affairs, ‘CY National Strategy for EU Affairs’ (November 2021)

[2] ‘National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs)’ <https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/energy-strategy/national-energy-and-climate-plans-necps_en>

[3] ‘Cyprus’ Integrated National Energy and Climate Plan’ (January 2020)

[4] Theodoros Zachariadis, ‘Monitoring EU Energy Efficiency First Principle and Policy Implementation’ (Odyssee Mure, November 2021)

[5] ‘Invest Cyprus – CEO Interviews 2018’

[6] ‘Commission Participates in Launch of EuroAsia Electricity Interconnector’

[7] EuroAsia, ‘Significant Benefits for Cyprus from Construction of the EuroAsia Interconnector | EuroAsia Interconnector’ (26 July 2023)

[8] ‘PRELIMINARY DRAFT UPDATE CONSOLIDATED NATIONAL PLAN OF CYPRUS ON ENERGY AND CLIMATE OF CYPRUS 2023’ (27 July 2023)

[9] Department of Environment, Ministry of Agriculture, and Rural Development and Environment, ‘Cyprus’ Long-Term Low GHG Emission Development’ (September 2022)

[10] ‘The Just Transition Mechanism’

[11] Aliénor Cameron and others, ‘A Just Transition Fund – How the EU Budget Can Best Assist in the Necessary Transition from Fossil Fuels to Sustainable Energy’ [2020] Policy Department for Budgetary Affairs Directorate General for Internal Policies of the Union

[12] Sebastiano Sabato and Boris Fronteddu, ‘A Socially Just Transition through the European Green Deal?’ [2020] SSRN Electronic Journal

[13] ‘Partnership Agreement and Just Transition Plan for Cyprus’ (European Commission – European Commission)

[14] ‘ΘΑΛΕΙΑ 2021-2027- Θεμέλια Αλλαγής, Ευημερίας, Ισότητας Και Ανάπτυξης’ (2022)

[15] ‘Short Description – ΘΑλΕΙΑ 2021-2027’ (21 June 2022)

[16] Green Deal: Pioneering Proposals to Restore Europe’s Nature by 2050 and Halve Pesticide Use by 2030’

[17] European Commission, ‘2023 Country Report – Cyprus’, (2023), COM(2023) 613 final