Tag: Taxation

Corporate tax policy and the European Union institutions

Posted on | by Paschalis Paschali
Newsletter: Corporate tax policy and the European Union institutions by C. HJI Panayi, June 2024

On the 9th of June 2024, Cyprus and other Member States elected their representatives to the European Parliament. This is the only institution of the European Union whose members are directly elected from the people. Nevertheless, this is also one of the institutions with limited powers in many areas. As far as taxation is concerned, the European Parliament has no role whatsoever in the legislative process. This is rather ironic, given the general political slogan of ‘no taxation without representation’.

But which institution makes tax policy in the European Union? The answer is not very straightforward and requires a basic understanding of institutional dynamics in the European Union and competences.

The most important institutions in the European Union are the European Commission, the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament, the European Council and the Court of Justice of the European Union. The legal system of the European Union, as underpinned by the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, empowers these institutions to participate in the law-making process but only when such power has been so conferred under EU law. In other words, different institutions have different law-making powers, and can only act within the scope of these powers (i.e. competences).

The European Commission is the quasi-executive body of the European Union which proposes laws and manages and implements EU policies. In the field of competition law, it also has some judicial functions. There are 27 Commissioners – one from each Member State. The Commissioners are not directly elected but they are appointed by the government of each Member State. However, once appointed, they are not supposed to represent their Member State. Rather, they take on a portfolio of a policy area and assisted by the relevant directorates-general, they exercise leadership in that area. As far as taxation is concerned, the relevant portfolio is that of ‘economy’ and it is assisted by the DG-TAXUD.  

The Council of the European Union is the institution which represents Member State governments in different configurations. The configuration relevant for taxation is the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) configuration, which is made up of the economic and finance ministers from all Member States. It is in the ECOFIN meetings that the Commission tax proposals are considered and voted upon. The Presidency of the Council rotates among Member States every six months.

The European Council is the EU institution that defines the general political direction and priorities of the European Union. The members of the European Council are the heads of state or government of the 27 EU member states, the European Council President and the President of the European Commission. It has bi-annual meetings, usually at the end of each Council presidency.

The European Parliament comprises of the Members of the European Parliament, which are directly elected by voters in each Member State. Although usually parliaments are legislative bodies, the European Parliament’s powers are rather limited and circumscribed. In the adoption of legislative acts, a distinction is made between the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision), whereby the European Parliament is on an equal footing with the Council, and the special legislative procedures, which applies only in specific cases where Parliament has a consultative role only. In certain areas such as taxation the European Parliament can only ever give an advisory opinion.

The Court of Justice of the European Union is the judiciary of the European Union and is considered to be the guardian of the Treaties. The judges of the Court of Justice are appointed by Member States though again, not to represent the Member States, but to apply and interpret EU law in the spirit of the acquis communaitaire.

As mentioned above, each institution can only exercise law-making powers only to the extent that it has competence to do so – this is EU competence. Broadly, EU competence can be exclusive or shared. Where the EU does not have any competence, then this area has remained within the exclusive powers of Member States.

Trade policy and trade law is an exclusive competence of the European Union. This means that only the European Union (through the relevant institution(s)) can legislate on trade matters and conclude trade agreements with third countries. A Member State cannot enter into its own trade agreements with other countries, nor deviate from the EU’s trade rules. This was one of the thorny issues under the Brexit negotiations: the UK was not able to negotiate trade agreements with third countries until it left the EU. That is why there was a brief transition period following the UK’s departure from the EU during which period it still benefitted from the EU’s trade agreements with third countries.  

There can also be shared competence, where both the EU and Member States can legislate. Examples of shared competence are the internal market, environment and consumer protection.  

As far as corporate taxation is concerned, the EU has no competence whatsoever. This remains within the powers of Member States. Nevertheless, even in areas where the EU has no competence, sometimes, the EU legislates by using what I call ‘proxy’ legal bases under the Treaty. More characteristically, in the area of taxation, general (i.e. non-tax specific) Treaty provisions have been used to propose tax legislation, such as Art 115 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Pursuant to this Article, the Commission can propose directives in any area it does not have competence (e.g. taxation) on the basis that this is necessary for the establishment or functioning of the internal market. This Treaty provision stipulates that for these proposals to become law, they must be approved by all Member States in Council. This unanimity requirement often makes it very difficult for any tax proposal to go through, as even one Member State can veto the proposal.

A distinction should be made between direct taxation (which includes corporate taxation and the taxation of individuals) and indirect taxation (which includes VAT, customs & excise taxes, etc). The latter area is largely harmonized. It should be pointed out that the Treaty provision which enables the harmonization of indirect taxes (Art 113 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) also requires unanimity in Council. However, from the early stages of the European Union, there has always been more willingness by Member States to harmonise these taxes compared to direct taxes, which are thought of as more closely aligned with sovereignty.

In any case, due to the lack of competences and the use of general Treaty proxy bases, the Commission and the Council are effectively the only EU institutions that have a meaningful role in the development of direct tax policy. This can be problematic if it is a controversial proposal, which does not enjoy the support of all Member States. It can take years for such proposal to go through, if at all. Even if it does go through, the amendments made to appease some Member States may significantly water down the approved legislation or render it incoherent.

Let us take as an example the proposal for a Financial Transaction Tax. This was first proposed in 2011 but has never been approved. There was an attempt to bypass the unanimity requirement by proposing to introduce a Directive through enhanced cooperation (i.e. only to bind the Member States agreeing to it) but again, this has not been successful. Up until recently, a draft Directive on a Financial Transaction Tax featured in the agenda of ECOFIN meetings but it seems to have faded away.

A more recent example of a proposal which faced opposition in Council but this time eventually got through is the Directive on Minimum Effective Tax Rate. This was originally proposed in December 2021, with the expectation that it would be transposed into the domestic law of Member States by 1 January 2023. However, from the beginning Member States voiced concerns and asked for the delayed implementation of it (mostly, Estonia, Hungary and Poland). Two subsequent revised compromise texts were rejected at ECOFIN meetings in March and April 2022. Whilst many had written off this draft Directive, rather surprisingly, unanimity was achieved in Council (at an ECOFIN meeting) in December 2022 and the Directive was eventually approved.

One could argue that the power of the fiscal veto protects some of the smaller Member States from being forced into unwanted tax harmonization. However, experience from recent years suggests that apart from some Member States in the eastern bloc, smaller Member States such as Cyprus, Malta, Ireland, Luxembourg are unlikely to veto tax proposals. The fiscal veto is more effectively used by the larger Member States to block a proposal. For example, the UK’s objections to the proposed Financial Transaction Tax were one of the reasons that the proposal never went very far. It was feared that with the UK’s departure from the European Union there would be a power vacuum and all tax proposals would be pushed through in Council but some Member States have very effectively filled this gap.  

This brief overview explains how the institutional dynamics, combined with the very restrictive legal bases (Treaty bases) for harmonization, have led to limited and often uncoordinated legislation produced in the area of corporate taxation. There have been calls to remove the unanimity requirement and allow other Treaty bases to be used which only require qualified majority voting. So far, these calls have been resisted by most Member States. Nevertheless, this seems to be a pyrrhic victory as experience so far shows that many of the smaller Member States are rather muted when it comes to negotiations in Council. But the threat of vetoing Commission tax proposals, especially if raised by more than one Member States, is a powerful deterrent for the Commission to make amendments. Therefore, alliances amongst Member States are crucial in influencing tax policy in the EU.  

What this brief note shows is that in principle, Member State governments have the final say in the development of corporate tax policy, through their voting in Council. However, whether they choose (or are able to) exercise their power of veto is often a political question. Rather counterintuitively, due to the limitations of the legislative process, taxpayers often have a greater role in the development of tax law in the EU, but in a reactive manner. Taxpayers can challenge domestic tax laws on the basis that they breach the EU’s fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights. They can also make complaints to the Commission and urge it to start an infringement proceeding against a Member State on the basis of Art 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Many important developments in the area of corporate tax policy in the European Union were in fact a result of taxpayers’ action, with the help of a good legal team.

For more information on any of the issues raised in this newsletter, please get in touch with us.

State Aid and Taxation

Posted on | by Paschalis Paschali

Fiscal state aid is a hot topic right now, with a number of high-profile cases going through the European courts.

Under EU law, Member States are prohibited from giving an advantage in any form whatsoever to undertakings on a selective basis, unless it is justified by reasons of general economic development. 

The test is set out in Art 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU):

“[…] any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.”

The concept of state aid is wider than that of a subsidy, embracing not only positive benefits, such as subsidies, but ‘also interventions which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which, without therefore being subsidies in the strict meaning of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect’.

An aid could include subsidies, interest-free or low-interest loans or interest rate subsidies, guarantees on preferential terms, supply of goods or services on preferential terms, capital injections on preferential terms etc.

In order to fall under the scope of Art 107 TFEU, the aid must be granted by a Member State or through Member State resources. This encompasses regional or local authorities and public bodies. There must be a burden on state resources, not just an incidental benefit given without a financial burden.

Very importantly, the aid must favour certain undertakings or the production of certain goods (the ‘selectivity’ principle), which distort or threaten to distort competition, and must be capable of affecting trade between Member States.

The salient question is whether the recipient of the advantage is receiving a benefit that it would not have otherwise received under normal market conditions. The benefit should improve the undertaking’s financial position or reduce the costs that it would have had to bear.

The Commission does not need to prove that trade will be affected. It is sufficient to show that the measure threatens competition, i.e. that intra-EU trade may be affected and not necessarily permanently. For general guidance, see the Commission’s 2016 Notice.

Under Art 107(2) TFEU, certain types of aid such as aid of a social character or aid to help in case of a natural disaster are deemed to be compatible with EU law. Furthermore, aid may be compatible with the internal market if it falls within any of the six derogations laid down in Art 107(3) TFEU. These derogations have been construed strictly, though some of these proved essential in the context of past financial crises and the COVID-19 era.

Whether or not a measure is state aid for the purposes of this provision is a question that the courts both at European and national level have competence to decide. However, whether such state aid is compatible with the common market (i.e. whether it is lawful), is a question that the national courts do not have legal competence to deal with – only the European Commission at first instance.

The Commission has a pivotal role in the application of the state aid prohibition. It keeps constant review of existing aids offered by Member States. Furthermore, Member States are required to notify the Commission as to any plans to grant or alter state aid. The Commission may also ask the Court of Justice to order a Member State to recover illegal state aid.

Companies themselves may trigger investigations by lodging complaints with the Commission. In fact, during an investigation (or even prior to it), the Commission often invites interested parties to submit comments. A company may be affected by the state aid prohibition whether it is the recipient of aid or the competitor of the recipient. Recently, a direct action against a Commission decision brought by competitors of the beneficiaries of a state aid measure was allowed in the Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori case.

Aid given to a company must be repaid if it is unlawful or has not been properly notified or approved by the Commission. If repayment is demanded, within a period of four months, the taxpayer must reimburse the full amount of the financial benefit conferred, including interest, for up to a maximum of ten years prior to the start of an investigation. No recovery is necessary when the unlawful aid was given more than ten years before the Commission’s decision.

The state aid prohibition has become very high profile in the tax field. Tax measures that relieve the recipients of charges that are normally borne from their budgets such as reductions in the tax base, total or partial reduction in the amount of tax (exemption of tax credit), deferment, cancellation or even special rescheduling of tax debt are examples of fiscal state aid. Such tax measures are thought to be granted by the state or through state resources. This is because a tax exemption mitigates the charge that would normally be recoverable from the undertaking. Therefore, the state loses tax revenue. This loss of tax revenue is equivalent to consumption of state resources in the form of fiscal expenditure.

Recent state aid investigations have centred around tax rulings or advance pricing agreements given by Member State tax authorities to various multinationals. What was objectionable to the Commission in each of these cases was that the tax rulings given by Member States allowed the MNE beneficiaries to depart from market conditions in setting the commercial conditions of intra-group transactions, which led to significant tax reductions and very low effective tax rates.

Questioning discretionary practices of tax administrations is not something new in the area of state aid. As noted in the 1998 Commission state aid notice on business taxation, treating economic agents on a discretionary basis may mean that the individual application of a general measure takes on the features of a selective measure, in particular where exercise of the discretionary power goes beyond the simple management of tax revenue by reference to objective criteria.

In the last few months, decisions of the European Court of Justice on some of these cases have come out but we are still waiting for many more. What seems to be emerging from the Fiat and Starbucks appeals is that a tax ruling which does not seem to follow the OECD’s arm’s length principle does not necessarily mean that it falls within the scope of the EU’s state aid prohibition. It is important to assess the reference system of the investigated Member State in order to determine whether the tax ruling is an exception to that system and not whether it deviates from a general abstract arm’s length principle.

Of course as the arm’s length principle as well as the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines are now incorporated or closely followed by most Member States, including Cyprus, a tax ruling or advance pricing agreement given by the tax administration which allows a tax treatment incompatible with the arm’s length principle is very likely to fall foul of the state aid prohibition. Therefore, special caution should be taken by tax authorities in giving tax rulings, to ensure that the rulings are aligned with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Furthermore, undertakings receiving beneficial tax treatment – whether through a ruling or advance pricing agreement or other mitigating measure – should bear in mind that if it is too good to be true, it is probably state aid and will need to be reimbursed at some point.

For more information on any of the issues raised in this newsletter, please get in touch with us.